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Abstract
This paper seeks to establish a framework for
directing a society of simple, specialized, self-
interested agents to solve what traditionally are
posed as monolithic single-agent sequential de-
cision problems. What makes it challenging to
use a decentralized approach to collectively opti-
mize a central objective is the difficulty in char-
acterizing the equilibrium strategy profile of non-
cooperative games. To overcome this challenge,
we design a mechanism for defining the learning
environment of each agent for which we know
that the optimal solution for the global objective
coincides with a Nash equilibrium strategy profile
of the agents optimizing their own local objectives.
The society functions as an economy of agents
that learn the credit assignment process itself by
buying and selling to each other the right to oper-
ate on the environment state. We derive a class of
decentralized reinforcement learning algorithms
that are broadly applicable not only to standard
reinforcement learning but also for selecting op-
tions in semi-MDPs and dynamically composing
computation graphs. Lastly, we demonstrate the
potential advantages of a society’s inherent modu-
lar structure for more efficient transfer learning.
You know that everything you think and do is thought and
done by you. But what’s a “you”? What kinds of smaller
entities cooperate inside your mind to do your work?
(Minsky, 1988)
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1. Introduction
Biological processes, corporations, and ecosystems – physi-
cally decentralized, yet in some sense functionally unified.
A corporation, for example, optimizes for maximizing prof-
its as it were a single rational agent. But this agent abstrac-
tion is an illusion: the corporation is simply a collection of
human agents, each solving their own optimization prob-
lems, most not even knowing the existence of many of their
colleagues. But the human as the decision-making agent is
also simply an abstraction of the trillions of cells making
their own simpler decisions. The society of agents is itself an
agent. What mechanisms bridge between these two levels
of abstraction, and under what framework can we develop
learning algorithms for studying the self-organizing nature
of intelligent societies that pervade so much of the world?
Both the monolithic and the multi-agent optimization frame-
works in machine learning offer a language for representing
only one of the levels of abstraction but not the relation
between both. The monolithic framework, the most com-
monly used in much of modern machine learning, considers
a single agent that optimizes a single objective in an en-
vironment, whether it be minimizing classification loss or
maximizing return. The multi-agent framework considers
multiple agents that each optimize their own independent
objective and each constitute each other’s learning envi-
ronments. What distinguishes the multi-agent from the
monolithic is the presence of multiple independent opti-
mization problems. The difficulty of interpreting a learner
in the monolithic framework as a society of more simpler
components is that all components are still globally cou-
pled together by the same optimization problem without
independent local optimization problems themselves, as are
the weights in a neural network trained by backpropagation.
The difficulty of interpreting a multi-agent system under a
global optimization problem is the computational difficulty
of computing Nash equilibrium (Daskalakis et al., 2009),
even for general two-player games (Chen et al., 2009).
To better understand the relationship between the society
and the agent, this paper makes four contributions, each of
which exist at a different level of abstraction. At the highest
level, we define the societal decision-making framework
to relate the local optimization problem of the agent to the
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global optimization problem of the society in the following
restricted setting. Each agent is specialized to transform the
environment from one state to another. The agents bid in
an auction at each state and the auction winner transforms
the state into another state, which it sells to the agents at the
next time-step, thereby propagating a series of economic
transactions. This framework allows us to ask what are
properties of the auction mechanism and of the society that
enable the global solution to a Markov decision process
(MDP) that the society solves to emerge implicitly as a
consequence of the agents optimizing their own independent
auction utilities.
At the second level, we present a solution to this question by
introducing the cloned Vickrey society that guarantees that
the dominant strategy equilibrium of the agents coincides
with the optimal policy of the society. We prove this result
by leveraging the truthfulness property of the Vickrey auc-
tion (Vickrey, 1961) and showing that initializing redundant
agents makes the primitives’ economic transactions robust
against market bubbles and suboptimal equilibria.
At the third level, we propose a class of decentralized re-
inforcement learning algorithms for optimizing the MDP
objective of the society as an emergent consequence of the
agents’ optimizing their own auction utilities. These algo-
rithms treat the auction utility as optimization objectives
themselves, thereby learning a societal policy that is global
in space and time using only credit assignment for learnable
parameters that is local in space and time.
At the fourth level, we empirically investigate various im-
plementations of the clone Vickrey society under our de-
centralized reinforcement learning algorithm and find that
a particular set of design choices, which we call the credit
conserving Vickrey implementation, yields both the best
performance at the societal and and agent level.
Finally, we demonstrate that the societal decision making
framework, along with its solution, the algorithm that learns
the solution, and the implementation of this algorithm, is a
broadly applicable perspective on self-organization to not
only standard reinforcement learning but also for selecting
options in semi-MDPs (Sutton et al., 1999) and for compos-
ing functions in dynamic computation graphs. Moreover, we
show evidence that the local credit assignment mechanisms
of societal decision-making framework produce more effi-
cient learning than the global credit assignment mechanisms
of the monolithic framework.
2. Related Work
Describing an intelligent system as the product of interac-
tions among many individual agents dates as far back as
the Republic (Plato, 380 B.C.), in which Plato analyzes the
human mind via an analogy to a political state. This theme
continued into the early foundations of AI in the 1980s
and 1990s through cognitive models such as the Society of
Mind (Minsky, 1988) and Braitenberg vehicles (Braitenberg,
1986) and engineering successes in robotics (Brooks, 1991)
and in visual pattern recognition (Selfridge, 1988).
The closest works to ours were the algorithms developed
around that same time period that sought as we do to lever-
age a multi-agent society for achieving a global objective,
starting as early as the bucket brigade algorithm (Holland,
1985), in which agents bid in a first-price auction to operate
on the state and auction winners directly paid their bid to the
winners from the previous step. Prototypical self-referential
learning mechanisms (Schmidhuber, 1987) improved the
bucket brigade by imposing credit conservation in the eco-
nomic transactions. The neural bucket brigade (Schmidhu-
ber, 1989) adapted the bucket brigade to learning neural
network weights, where payoffs corresponded to weight
changes. Baum (1996) observed that the optimal choice for
an agent’s bid should be equivalent to the optimal Q-value
for executing that agent’s transformation and developed the
Hayek architecture for introducing new agents and remov-
ing agents that have gone broke. Kwee et al. (2001) added
external memory to the Hayek architecture.
However, to this date there has been no proof to the best
of our knowledge that the bid-updating schemes proposed
in these works simultaneously optimize a global objective
of the society. Sutton (1988) provides a convergence proof
for temporal difference methods that share some properties
with the bucket brigade credit assignment scheme, but im-
portantly does not take the competition between the individ-
ual agents into account. But it is precisely the competition
among agents in multi-agent learning that make their equilib-
ria nontrivial to characterize (Mazumdar et al., 2019). Our
work offers an alternative auction mechanism for which we
prove that the optimal solution for the global objective does
coincide with a Nash equilibrium of the society. In contrast
to other works that decouple the computation graph (Sri-
vastava et al., 2013; Goyal et al., 2019; Peng et al., 2019;
Pathak et al., 2019) but optimize a global objective, our
work considers optimizing local objectives only. We con-
sider economic transactions between time-steps, as opposed
to within a single time-step (Ohsawa et al., 2018).
3. Preliminaries
To set up a framework for societal decision-making, we
relate Markov decision processes (MDP) and auctions un-
der a unifying language. We define an environment as a
tuple that specifies an input space, an output space, and
additional parameters for specifying an objective. An agent
is a function that maps the input space to the output space.
An objective is a functional that maps the learner to a real
number. Given an environment and objective, the problem
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the agent solves is to maximize the value of the objective.
In the MDP environment, the input space is the state space
S and the output space is the action space A. The agent is a
policy pi : S → A. The transition function T : S ×A → S ,
the reward function r : S × A → R, and discount fac-
tor γ are additional parameters that specify the objective:
the return J(pi) = Eτ∼ppi(τ)
[∑T
t=0 γ
tr (st, at)
]
, where
ppi(τ) = p(s0)
∏T
t=0 pi(at|st)
∏T−1
t=0 T (st+1|st, at). The
agent solves the problem of finding pi∗ = arg maxpi J(pi).
For any state s, the optimal action for maximizing J(pi)
is pi∗(s) = arg maxaQ
∗(s, a), where the optimal Q
function Q∗(s, a) is recursively defined as Q∗(s, a) =
Es′∼T (s,a) [r(s, a) + γmaxa′ Q∗(s′, a′)|s, a].
In the auction environments we consider, the input space is
a single auction item s and the output space is the bidding
space B. Instead of a single agent, each of N agents ψ1:N
compete to bid for the auction item via its bidding policy
ψi : {s} → B. Let b be the vector of bids produced by
ψ1:N . The vector vs of each agent’s valuations for auc-
tion item s and the auction mechanism – allocation rule
X : BN → [0, 1]N and pricing rule P : BN → RN≥0 – are
additional parameters that specify each agent’s objective:
the utility U is(ψ
1:N ) = vis ·Xi(b)− P i(b), where Xi(b)
is the proportion of s allocated to i, and P i(b) is the scalar
price i pays. Each agent i independently solves the problem
of finding ψi∗ = arg maxψi U
i
s(ψ
1:N ). The independent
optimization of objectives distinguishes a multi-agent prob-
lem from a single-agent one and makes multi-agent prob-
lems generally difficult to analyze when an agent’s optimal
policy depends on the strategies of other agents.
However, if an auction is dominant strategy incentive com-
patible (DSIC), bidding one’s own valuation is optimal, inde-
pendent of other players’ bidding strategies. That is, truthful
bidding is the unique dominant strategy. Notably, the Vick-
rey auction (Vickrey, 1961), which sets P i(b) to be the
second highest bid maxj 6=i bj and Xi(b) = 1 if i wins and
0 and 0 respectively if i loses, is DSIC, which means the
dominant strategy equilibrium occurs when every agent bids
truthfully, making the Vickrey auction straightforward to
analyze. Another attractive property of the Vickrey auction
is that the dominant strategy equilibrium automatically max-
imizes the social welfare
∑N
i=1 v
i ·Xi(b) (Roughgarden,
2016), which selects the bidder with the highest valuation as
winner. The existence of dominant strategies in the Vickrey
auction removes the need for agents to recursively model
others, giving the Vickrey auction the practical benefit of
running in linear time (Roughgarden, 2016).
4. Societal Decision-Making
The perspective of this paper is that a society of agents can
be abstracted as an agent that itself solves an optimization
problem at a global level as an emergent consequence of
the optimization problems its constituent agents solve at
the local level. To make this abstraction precise, we now
introduce the societal decision-making framework for an-
alyzing and developing algorithms that relate the global
decision problem of a society to the local decision problems
of its constituent agents. We use primitive and society to
distinguish between the agents at the local and global levels,
respectively, which we define in the context of their local
and global environments and objectives:
Definition 4.1. A primitive ω is a tuple (ψ, φT ) of a bidding
policy ψ : S → B and transformation φT : S → S .
Definition 4.2. A society Ω is a set of primitives ω1:N .
The global environment is an MDP that we call the global
MDP, with state space S and discrete action space A =
{1, ..., N} that indexes the primitives ω1:N . The local envi-
ronment is an auction that we call the local auction with
auction item s ∈ S and bidding space B = [0,∞).
The connection between the local and global environments
is as follows. Each state in the global MDP is an auction
item for a different local auction. The winning primitive
ωˆ of the auction at state s transforms s into the next state
s′ of the global MDP using its transformation φT , param-
eterized by the global MDP’s transition function T . For
each primitive i at each state s, its local objective is the util-
ity U is(ψ
1:N ). Its local problem is to maximize U is(ψ1:N ).
The global objective is the return J(piΩ) in the global MDP
of the global policy piΩ. The global problem for the soci-
ety is to maximize J(piΩ). We define the optimal societal Q
function Q∗Ω(s, ω) as the expected return received from ω
invoking its transformation φT on s and the society activat-
ing primitives optimally with respect to J(piΩ) afterward.
Since all decisions made at the societal level are an emergent
consequence of decisions made at the primitive level, the
societal decision-making framework is a self-organization
perspective on a broad range of sequential decision prob-
lems. If each transformation φT specifies a literal action,
then societal decision-making is a decentralized re-framing
of standard reinforcement learning (RL). Societal decision-
making also encompasses the decision problem of choosing
φT s as options in semi-MDPs (Sutton et al., 1999) as well as
choosing φT s as functions in a computation graph (Chang
et al., 2018; Rosenbaum et al., 2017; Alet et al., 2018).
We are interested in auction mechanisms and learning algo-
rithms for optimizing the global objective as an emergent
consequence of optimizing the local objectives. Translating
problems from one level of abstraction to another in this
way would enable the design of decentralized learning al-
gorithms that are inherently modular. It would also provide
a recipe for engineering a multi-agent system to achieve a
desired global outcome and permit theoretical expectations
Decentralized Reinforcement Learning: Global Decision-Making via Local Economic Transactions
on the nature of the equilibrium of the society. To this end,
we present in the next section an auction mechanism for
which the dominant strategy equilibrium of the primitives
coincides with the optimal policy of the society, which we
develop into a class of decentralized RL algorithms in the
later sections.
5. Mechanism Design for the Society
We first observe that to produce the optimal global policy,
the optimal bidding strategy for each primitive at each local
auction must be to bid their societal Q-value. By defining
each primitive’s valuation of a state as its optimal societal Q-
value at that state, we show that the Vickrey auction ensures
the dominant strategy equilibrium profile of the primitives
coincides with the optimal global policy. Then we show that
a market economy perspective on societal decision-making
overcomes the need to assume knowledge of optimal Q-
values, although weakens the dominant strategy equilibrium
to a Nash equilibrium. Lastly, we explain that adding redun-
dant primitives to the society mitigates market bubbles by
enforcing credit conservation. Proofs are in the Appendix.
5.1. Optimal Bidding
We state what was observed informally in (Baum, 1996):
Proposition 5.1. Assume at each state s the local auction al-
locates Xi(b) = 1 if i wins and Xi(b) = 0 if i loses. Then
all primitives ωi bidding their optimal societal Q-values
Q∗Ω(s, ω
i) collectively induce an optimal global policy.
This proposition makes the problem of self-organization
concrete: getting the optimal behavior in the global MDP
to emerge from the optimal behavior in the local auctions
can be reduced to incentivizing the primitives to bid their
optimal societal Q-value at every state.
5.2. Dominant Strategies for Optimal Bidding
To incentivize the primitives to bid optimally, we propose to
define the primitives’ valuations vis for each state s as their
optimal societal Q-values Q∗Ω(s, ω
i) and use the Vickrey
auction mechanism for each local auction.
Theorem 5.2. If the valuations vis for each state s are
the optimal societal Q-values Q∗Ω(s, ω
i), then the society’s
optimal global policy coincides with the primitives’ unique
dominant strategy equilibrium under the Vickrey mechanism.
Then, the utilityU is(ψ
1:N ) at each state s that induces the op-
timal global policy, which we refer equivalently as Uˆ is(ω
1:N )
for the winning primitive ωˆi and U js (ω
1:N ) for losing prim-
itives ωj , is given by
Uˆ is(ω
1:N ) = Q∗Ω(s, ωˆ
i)−max
j 6=i
bjs (1)
and by U js (ω
1:N ) = 0 for losing primitives.
5.3. Economic Transactions for Propagating Q∗Ω
We have so far defined optimal bidding with respect to soci-
etal decision-making and characterized the utilities as func-
tions of Q∗Ω for which such bidding is a dominant strategy.
We now propose to redefine the utilities without knowledge
of Q∗Ω by viewing the society as a market economy.
Monolithic frameworks for solving MDPs, such as directly
optimizing the policy J(pi) with policy gradient methods,
are analogous to command-economies, in which all pro-
duction – the transformation of past states st into future
states st+1 – and wealth distribution – the credit assignment
of reward signals to parameters – derive directly from single
central authority – the MDP objective. In contrast, under
the societal decision-making framework, the optimal global
policy does not derive directly from the MDP objective, but
rather emerges implicitly as the equilibrium of the primitives
optimizing their own local objectives. We thus redefine the
valuations vis following the analogy of a market economy,
in which production and wealth distribution are governed
by the economic transactions between the primitives.
Specifically, we couple the local auctions at consecutive
time-steps in the same game by defining the valuation vist of
primitive ωˆi for winning the auction item st as the revenue
it can receive in the auction at the next time-step by selling
the product st+1 of executing its transformation φiT on st.
This compensation comes as the environment reward plus
the (discounted) winning bid at the next time-step:
Uˆ ist(ω
1:N )︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility
= r(st, ωˆ
i) + γ ·max
k
bkst+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue, or valuation vist
−max
j 6=i
bjst︸ ︷︷ ︸
price
. (2)
Analogous to a market economy, the revenue ωˆi receives for
producing st+1 from st depends on the price the winning
primitive ωˆk at t + 1 is willing to bid for st+1. In turn,
ωˆk sells st+2 to the winning primitive at t + 2, and so on.
Ultimately currency is grounded in the reward. Wealth is
distributed based on what future primitives decide to bid for
the fruits of the labor of information processing carried out
by past primitives transforming one state to another.
Definition 5.1. A Market MDP is a global MDP in which
all utilities are defined as in Equation 2.
As valuations now depend on the strategies of future primi-
tives, the dominant strategy equilibrium from Theorem 5.2
must be weakened to a Nash equilibrium in the general case:
Proposition 5.3. In a Market MDP, it is a Nash equilibrium
for every primitive to bidQ∗Ω(s, ω
i). Moreover, if the Market
MDP is finite horizon, then bidding Q∗Ω(s, ω
i) is the unique
Nash equilibrium that survives iterated deletion of weakly
dominated strategies.
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Figure 1. The cloned Vickrey society. In this market economy of
primitive agents, wealth is distributed not directly from the global
MDP objective but based on what future primitives decide to bid
for the fruits of the labor of information processing carried out by
past primitives transforming one state to another. The primitive
ω0
′
t that wins the auction at time t receives an environment reward
r(st, ω
0′
t ) as well as payment b1
′
t+1 from ω1
′
t+1 for transforming st
to st+1. By the Vickrey auction, the price ω1
′
t+1 pays to transform
st+1 is the second highest bid b1t+1 at time t + 1. Because each
primitive ωi and its clone ωi
′
have the same valuations, their bids
are equivalent and so credit is conserved through time.
5.4. Redundancy for Credit Conservation
In general, credit is not conserved in the Market MDP: the
winning primitive at time t− 1 gets paid an amount equal to
the highest bid at time t, but the winner at time t only pays
an amount equal to the second highest bid at time t. At time
t, ωi could bid arbitrarily higher than maxj 6=i bj without
penalty, which distorts the valuations for primitives that bid
before time t, creating a market bubble.
To prevent market bubbles, we propose a modification to the
society, which we will call a cloned society, for enforcing
credit conservation – for all transformations φT initialize at
least two primitives that share the same φT :
Lemma 5.4. For a cloned society, at the Nash equilibrium
specified in Proposition 5.3, what the winning primitive ωˆi
at time t receives from the winning primitive ωˆk at t+ 1 is
exactly what ωˆk pays: bkst+1 .
We now state our main result.
Theorem 5.5. Define a cloned Vickrey society as a cloned
society that solves a Market MDP. Then it is a Nash equilib-
rium for every primitive in the cloned Vickrey society to bid
Q∗Ω(s, ω
i). In addition, the price that the winning primitive
pays for winning is equivalent to what it bid.
The significance of Theorem 5.5 is that guaranteeing truthful
bidding of societal Q-values decouples the analysis of the
local problem within each time-step from that of the global
problem across time-steps, which opens the possibility for
designing learners to reach a Nash equilibrium that we know
exists. Without such a separation of these two levels of
abstraction the entire society must be analyzed as a repeated
game through time – a non-trivial challenge.
6. From Equilibria to Learning Objectives
So far the discussion has centered around the quality of the
equilibria, which assumes the primitives know their own
valuations. We now propose a class of decentralized RL
algorithms for learning optimal bidding behavior without
assuming knowledge of the primitives’ valuations.
Instead of learning to optimize the MDP objective directly,
we propose to train the primitives’ parameterized bidding
policies to optimize their utilities in Equation 2, yielding
a class of decentralized RL algorithms for optimizing the
global RL objective that is agnostic to the choice of RL
algorithm used to train each primitive. By Theorem 5.5,
truthful bidding for all agents is one global optimum to all
agent’s local learning problems that also serves as a global
optimum for the society as whole. In the special case where
the transformation φT is a literal action, this class of de-
centralized RL algorithms can serve as an alternative to any
standard algorithm for solving discrete-action MDPs. An
on-policy learning procedure is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 On-Policy Decentralized RL
1: Initialize: Primitives ω1:N , Memorym1:N , RL update rule f
2: while True do
3: . Sample Episode
4: while episode has not terminated do
5: ω1:N observe state s
6: ω1:N produce bids b1s, ...,bNs
7: Auction selects winner ωˆ with transformation φˆT
8: ωˆ produces s′ = φˆT (s)
9: Record environment reward r(s, ωˆ)
10: s← s′
11: end while
12: . Compute Utilities
13: for each time-step t until the end of sampled episode do
14: ωˆt gets Uˆist (ω
1:N ) = r(st, ωˆt) + γ ·max
k
bkst+1
−max
j 6=i
bjst
15: Losers ωjt get Ujst (ω
1:N ) = 0
16: for all primitives ωi do
17: Primitive ωit stores (st,bist , st+1, U
i
st
(ωit)) intom
i
18: end for
19: end for
20: . Update
21: if time to update then
22: for all primitives ωi do
23: Update primitive ωi with update rule f with memorymi
24: end for
25: end if
26: end while
6.1. Local Credit Assignment in Space and Time
The global problem requires a solution that is global in
space, because the society must collectively work together,
and global in time, because the society must maximize ex-
pected return across time-steps. But an interesting property
of using the auction utility in Equation 2 as an RL objective
is that given redundant primitives it takes the form of the
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Bellman equation, thereby implicitly coupling all primitives
together in space and time. Thus each primitive need only
optimize for its immediate utility at a each time-step without
needing to optimize for its own future utilities. This class of
decentralized RL algorithms thus implicitly finds a global
solution in space and time using only credit assignment that
is local in space, because transactions are only between indi-
vidual agents, and local in time, because each primitive need
only solve a contextual bandit problem at each time-step.
6.2. Redundancy for Avoiding Suboptimal Equilibria
A benefit of casting local auction utilities as RL objectives
is the practical development of learning algorithms that
need not assume oracle knowledge of valuations, but unless
care is taken with each primitives’ learning environments,
the society may not converge to the globally optimal Nash
equilibrium described in Section 5. As an example of a
suboptimal equilibrium, in a Market MDP with two primi-
tives, even if v1 = 1,v2 = 2, it is a Nash equilibrium for
b1 = 100,b2 = 0. Without sufficient competitive pressure
to not overbid or underbid, a rogue winner lacks the risk
of losing to other primitives with similarly close valuations.
Fortunately, the redundancy of a cloned Vickrey society
serves a dual purpose of not only preventing market bubbles
but also introducing competitive pressure in the primitives’
learning environments in the form of other clones.
7. Experiments
Now, we study how well the cloned Vickrey society can
recover the optimal societal Q-function as its Nash equilib-
rium. We compare several implementations of the cloned
Vickrey society against baselines across simple tabular envi-
ronments in Section 7.1, where the transformations φT are
literal actions. Then in Section 7.2 we demonstrate the broad
applicability of the cloned Vickrey society for learning to
select options in semi-MDPs and composing functions in
a computation graph. Moreover, we show evidence for the
advantages of the societal decision making framework over
its monolithic counterpart in transferring to new tasks.
Although our characterization of the equilibrium and the
learning algorithm are agnostic to the implementation of
the primitive, in our bidding policy ψ is implemented as a
neural network that maps the state to the parameters of a
Beta distribution, from which a bid is sampled. We used
proximal policy optimization (PPO) (Schulman et al., 2017)
to optimize the bidding policy parameters.
7.1. Numerical Simulations
In the following simulations we ask: (1) How closely do
the bids the primitives learn match their optimal societal Q-
values? (2) Does the solution to the global objective emerge
(a) (b)
Figure 2. Market Bandits. We compare the cloned Vickrey so-
ciety (Cloned Vickrey Auction) against solitary societies that use
the first-price auction mechanism (first price auction), the Vickrey
auction mechanism (Vickrey Auction), and a mechanism whose
utility is only the environment reward (Environment Reward). The
dashed line in (a) indicates truthful bidding of valuations. The
cloned Vickrey society’s bids are closest to the true valuations
which also translates into the best global policy (b).
from the competition among the primitives? (3) How does
redundancy affect the solutions the primitives converge to?
We first consider the Market Bandit, the simplest global
MDP with one state, comparing the cloned Vickrey society
with societies with different auction mechanisms. Next we
consider the Chain environment, a sparse-reward multi-step
global MDP designed to study market bubbles. Last we
consider the Duality environment, a multi-step global MDP
designed to study suboptimal equilibria. We use solitary
society to refer to a society without redundant clones.
7.1.1. MARKET BANDITS AND AUCTION MECHANISMS
The simulation primarily studies question (1) by comparing
the auction mechanism of the cloned Vickrey society against
other mechanisms in eliciting bids that match optimal so-
cietal Q-values. We compare against first price auction,
based on Holland (1985), a solitary society that uses the first
price auction mechanism for the local auction, in which the
winning primitive pays a price of their bid, rather the second
highest bid; against Vickrey Auction, a solitary version of the
cloned Vickrey society; and against Environment Reward,
a baseline solitary society whose utility function uses only
the environment reward, with no price term P i(b).
The environment is a four-armed Market Bandit whose arms
correspond to transformations φ that deterministically yield
reward values of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8. Solitary societies
thus would have four primitives, while cloned societies
eight. Since we are mainly concerned with question (1), we
stochastically drop out a subset of primitives at every round
to give each primitive a chance to win and learn its value.
In the Market Bandit, the arm rewards directly specify
the primitives’ valuations, so if the primitives successfully
learned their valuations, we would expect them to learn to
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ωˆt Receives ωˆt+1 Pays
CCV b′t+1 b
′
t+1
BB bˆt+1 bˆt+1
V bˆt+1 b′t+1
Figure 3. Implementations. The table shows the bid price that
temporally consecutive winners ωˆt+1 and ωˆt pay and receive based
on three possible implementations of the cloned Vickrey society:
CCV, BB, V, with tradeoffs depicted in the Venn diagram. We use
bˆt+1 and b′t+1 to denote the highest and second highest bids at
time t+ 1 respectively.
bid values exactly at 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8. Figure 2a shows
that the primitives in the cloned Vickrey society learn to bid
most closely to their true valuations, which also translates
into the best global policy in Figure 2b, answering question
(2). To address question (3), we observe that the solitary
Vickrey society’s bids are more spread out than those of the
cloned Vickrey society because there is no competitive pres-
sure to learn the valuations exactly. This is not detrimental
when the global MDP has only one time-step, but the next
section shows that the lack of redundancy creates market
bubbles that result in a suboptimal global policy.
7.1.2. MARKET MDPS
Now we consider MDPs that involve multiple time-steps
to understand how learning is affected when primitives’
valuations are defined by the bids of future primitives. Re-
dundancy theoretically makes what the winner ωˆt receives
and ωˆt+1 equivalent, but the stochasticity of the bid distribu-
tion yields various possible implementations for the cloned
Vickrey society in the market MDP– bucket brigade (BB),
Vickrey (V), and credit conserving Vickrey (CCV), summa-
rized in Figure 3, with different pros and cons. Note that
the solitary bucket brigade society is a multiple time-step
analog of the first price auction in Section 7.1.1. We aim to
empirically test which of the implementations of the cloned
Vickrey society yields best local and global performance.
The Chain environment and market bubbles. A pri-
mary purpose of the Chain environment (Figure 5a) is to
study the effect of redundancy on mitigating market bubbles
in the bidding behavior and how that affects global optimal-
ity. The Chain environment is a sparse reward finite-horizon
environment which initializes the society at s0 on the left,
yields a terminal reward of 0.8 if the society enters the goal
state s5 on the right, and ends the episode after 20 steps if
the society does not reach the goal. Chain thus tests the
ability of the society to propagate utility from future agents
to past agents in the absence of an immediate environment
reward signal. We compare the bidding behaviors of the BB,
V, and CCV implementations of the cloned Vickrey society,
as well as those of their solitary counterparts, in Figure 5
(a) CCV solitary (b) BB solitary (c) V solitary
(d) CCV clone (e) BB clone (f) V clone
Figure 4. Learned Bidding Strategies for Chain. We organize
the analysis by distinguishing between the credit-conserving (CCV
and BB) and the non-credit-conserving (V) implementations. The
solitary CCV (a) and BB (b) implementations learn to bid very
close to 0: CCV because the valuation for a primitive at t is only
the second-highest bid at t + 1, resulting in a rapid decay in the
valuations leftwards down the chain; BB because each primitive is
incentivized to pay as low of a price for winning as possible. The
cloned CCV (d) and BB (e) implementations learn to implement
a form of return decomposition (Arjona-Medina et al., 2019) that
redistributes the terminal reward into a series of positive payoffs
back through the chain, each agent getting paid for contributing
to moving the society closer to the goal state, where the CCV
implementation’s bids are closer to the optimal societal Q-value
than those of the BB implementation. Because both the solitary (c)
and cloned (f) versions of the V implementations do not conserve
credit, they learn to bid close to the optimal societal Q-value, but
both suffer from market bubbles where the primitive for going
left bids higher than the primitive for going right, even though the
optimal global policy is to keep moving right.
and the society’s global learning curve in Figure 7a.
To answer question (1), we observe that redundancy indeed
prevents market bubbles, with the cloned CCV implementa-
tion bidding closet to the optimal societal Q values. Details
are in the caption of Figure 4. When we consider the so-
ciety’s global learning curve in Figure 7a, the answers to
questions (2) and (3) go hand-in-hand: the solitary societies
fail to find the globally optimal policy and the cloned CCV
implementation has the highest sample efficiency.
The Duality environment and suboptimal equilibria.
The Chain environment experiments suggested a connec-
tion between lack of redundancy and globally suboptimal
equilibria, the subtleties of which we explore further in the
Duality environment (Figure 5b). The CCV implementa-
tion has yielded the best performance so far but does not
guarantee Bellman optimality (Figure 3) without redundant
primitives. We show that in the Duality environment, with-
out redundant primitives the dominant strategy equilibrium
would lead the society to get stuck in a self-loop at s1 indef-
initely, even though the global optimal solution would be
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Figure 5. Multi-Step MDPs. (a) In the Chain environment, the society starts at state s0 and the goal state is s5. Only activating primitive
ω1 at state s4 yields reward. The optimal global policy is to directly move right by continually activating ω1. Without credit conservation,
the society may get stuck going back and forth between s0 and s4 without reaching the goal. (b) In the Duality environment, the society
starts at state s0. s−1 is an absorbing state with perpetual negative rewards. The optimal societal policy is to cycle between s0 and s1 to
receive unbounded reward, but without redundant primitives, the society may end up in a suboptimal perpetual self-loop at s1.
(a) solitary: s−1 (b) solitary: s0 (c) solitary: s1
(d) cloned: s−1 (e) cloned: s0 (f) cloned: s1
Figure 6. CCV Bidding Curves for Duality. Each column shows
the bidding curves of the solitary (top row) and cloned (bottom
row) CCV societies for states s−1, s0, and s1. Without redundant
primitives to force the second-highest and highest valuations to be
equal, the dominant strategy of truthful bidding may not coincide
with the globally optimal policy because the solitary CCV imple-
mentation does not guarantee Bellman optimality. The bidding
curves in (c) show that ω1 learns a best response of bidding higher
than primitive ω0 at state s1, even though it would be globally
optimal for the society if ω0 wins at s1. Adding redundant primi-
tives causes the second-highest and highest valuations to be equal,
causing ω0 to learn to bid highly as well at s1, which results in a
more optimal return as shown in Figure 7b.
to cycle back and forth between s0 and s1. The reasoning
for this is explained in Appendix F.1.2. Figure 7b indeed
shows that a society with redundant primitives learns a better
equilibrium than without.
7.2. Semi-MDPs and Computation Graphs
One benefit of framing global decision-making from the per-
spective of local economic transactions is that the same so-
cietal decision-making framework and learning algorithms
can be used regardless of the type of transformation φT .
We now demonstrate in the Two Rooms environment that
the cloned Vickrey society can learn more efficiently than
a monolithic counterpart to select among pre-trained op-
tions to solve a gym-minigrid (Chevalier-Boisvert et al.,
(a) Chain (b) Duality
Figure 7. Multi-Step MDP Global Learning Curves. We ob-
serve that cloned societies are more robust against suboptimal
equilibria than solitary societies. Furthermore the cloned CCV im-
plementation achieves the best sample efficiency, suggesting that
truthful bidding and credit-conservation are important properties
to enforce for enabling the optimal global policy to emerge.
2018) navigation task that involves two rooms separated
by a bottleneck state. We also demonstrate in the Mental
Rotation environment that the cloned Vickrey society can
also learn to dynamically compose computation graphs of
pre-specified affine transformations for classifying spatially
transformed MNIST digits. We use the cloned CCV society
for these experiments.
7.2.1. TRANSFERRING WITH OPTIONS IN SEMI-MDPS
We construct a two room environment, Two Rooms which
requires opening the red door and reaching either a green
goal or blue goal. The transformations φT are subpolicies
that have been pre-trained to open the red door, reach the
green goal, and reach the blue goal. In the pre-training task,
only reaching the green goal gives a non-zero terminal re-
ward and reaching the blue goal does not give reward. In the
transfer task, the rewards for reaching the green and blue
goals are switched. We compared the cloned Vickrey society
against a non-hierarchical monolithic baseline that selects
among the low-level gym-minigrid actions as well as
a hierarchical monolithic baseline that selects among the
pre-trained subpolicies. Both baseline policies sample from
a Categorical distribution and are trained with PPO. The
cloned Vickrey society is more sample efficient in learning
on the pre-training task and significantly faster in adapting
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Figure 8. Mental Rotation. The cloned Vickrey society learns to transform the image into a form that can be classified correctly with
a pre-trained classifier by composing two of six possible affine transformations of rotation and translation. Clones are indicated by an
apostrophe. In this example, the society activated primitive ω2
′
to translate the digit up then primitive ω1 to rotate the digit clockwise.
Though the bidding policies ψi and ψi′ of the clones ωi and ωi′ have the same parameters, their sampled bids may be different because
the bidding policies are stochastic.
Figure 9. Two Rooms. The cloned Vickrey society adapts more
quickly than the hierarchical monolithic baseline in both the pre-
training and the transfer tasks. We hypothesize this better learning
efficiency is due to the inherent modularity in the credit assignment
mechanism of decentralized reinforcement learning. This task is
difficult enough that the non-hierarchical monolithic baseline does
not learn to solve the task from scratch.
to the transfer task ( Figure 9). Our hypothesized explana-
tion for this efficiency is that the local credit assignment
mechanisms of a society parallelize learning across space
and time, a property that is not true of the global credit
assignment mechanisms of a monolithic learner.
7.2.2. COMPOSING DYNAMIC COMPUTATION GRAPHS
We adapt the Image Transformations task from Chang et al.
(2018) as what we call the Mental Rotation environment
(Figure 8), in which MNIST images have been transformed
with a composition of one of two rotations and one of four
translations. There are 60, 000 × 8 = 240, 000 possible
unique inputs, meaning learning an optimal global policy
involves training primitives across 240, 000 local auctions.
The transformations φT are pre-specified affine transforma-
tions. The society must transform the image into a form that
can be classified correctly with a pre-trained classifier, with
a terminal reward of 1 if the predicted label is correct and 0
otherwise. The cloned Vickrey society converges to a mean
return of 0.933 with a standard deviation of 0.014.
8. Conclusion
This work formally defines the societal decision-making
framework and proves the optimality of a society – the
cloned Vickrey society – for solving a problem that was first
posed in the AI literature in the 1980s: to specify the incen-
tive structure that causes the global solution of a society to
emerge as the equilibrium strategy profile of self-interested
agents. For training the society, we further proposed a class
of decentralized reinforcement learning algorithms whose
global objective decouples in space and time into simpler lo-
cal objectives. We have demonstrated the generality of this
framework for selecting actions, options, and computations
as well as its potential advantages for transfer learning.
The generality of the societal decision-making framework
opens much opportunity for future work in decentralized re-
inforcement learning. A society’s inherent modular structure
suggests the potential of reformulating problems with global
credit-assignment paths into problems with much more lo-
cal credit-assignment paths that offer more parallelism and
independence in the training of different components of a
learner. Understanding the learning dynamics of multi-agent
societies continues to be an open problem of research. It
would be exciting to explore algorithms for constructing
and learning societies in which the primitives are also soci-
eties themselves. We hope that the societal decision-making
framework and its associated decentralized reinforcement
learning algorithms provide a foundation for future work
exploring the potential of creating AI systems that reflect
the collective intelligence of multi-agent societies.
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A. Game Theory
In the context of this paper, a strategy of a primitive ω is equivalent to its bidding policy ψ. A strategy profile is the
set of strategies ψ1:N for all primitives ω1:N . For emphasis, we equivalently write the utility U i
(
ψ1:N
)
for player i as
U i
(
ψi;ψ−i
)
, where ψi is the strategy for player i and ψ−i is the strategy for all other players.
Definition A.1. Best Response: A strategy ψi is the best response for player i if given the strategies of all other players
ψ−i, ψi maximizes player i’s utility U i
(
ψi;ψ−i
)
.
Definition A.2. Nash Equilibrium: A strategy profile is in a Nash equilibrium if given the strategies of other players, each
player’s strategy is a best response.
Definition A.3. Dominant Strategy Equilibrium: A strategy ψ is a dominant strategy if it is the best response for a player
no matter what strategies the other players play. A dominant strategy equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium where
every player plays their dominant strategy.
Definition A.4. Weakly Dominated Strategies: Consider player i playing strategy ψi. Let the strategies for all other
players be ψ−i. A strategy ψi weakly dominates ψ˜i if for all strategies of other players ψ−i, U i(ψ;ψ−i) ≥ U i(ψ˜;ψ−i),
and there exists a ψ˜−i such that U i(ψi; ψ˜−i) > U i(ψ˜i; ψ˜−i). ψ is dominated if there exists a strategy which dominates it.
Definition A.5. Iterated Deletion of Dominated Strategies: Iterated deletion of dominated strategies repeatedly (a)
removes all dominated strategies for each player, then (b) updates the dominance relation (as now there are fewer strategies
of other players to consider). It terminates when all remaining strategies are undominated.
Vickrey Auction The Vickrey Auction is a type of single-item sealed bid auction. It is single-item, which means there is a
single auction item up for sale. It is sealed-bid, which means that the players have no knowledge of each others’ bids.
B. Societal Decision-Making Framework
Abstraction Level Global Local
Agent Society Ω = {ωi}Ni=1 Primitive ωi =
(
ψi, φi
)
Environment global MDP local auction at state s
State Space S the single state {s}
Action Space the indices of the primitives A = {1, 2, ..., N} the space of non-negative bids B = R≥0
Objective J(piΩ) = Eτ∼ppi(τ)
[∑T
t=0 γ
tr (st, ωt)
]
U is(ψ
1:N ) = vis ·Xi(b)− P i(b)
Problem maxpiΩ J(piΩ) maxψi U
i
s(ψ
1:N )
Table 1. Societal Decision-Making. This table specifies the agent, environment, objective, and problem at both the global and local
levels of abstraction in the societal-decision-making framework.
Though both the monolithic decision-making framework as well as the societal decision-making (in which the transformations
φ correspond to literal actions) can both be used for reinforcement learning, the key difference between the two is that the
learnable parameters are trained to optimize the objective of the MDP in the monolithic framework, whereas the learnable
parameters are trained to optimize the objective of the auction at each state of the MDP in the societal framework.
C. The Cloned Vickrey Society as a Solution to Societal Decision-Making
The MDP specifies the environment. The society specifies the abstract agent that interacts in the environment. The Market
MDP is a global MDP governed by a specific type of auction mechanism (the Vickrey mechanism) that is agnostic to the
architecture of the society that interacts with it. A cloned society is a specific architecture of society (one with redundant
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primitives) that is agnostic to the auction mechanism governing the global MDP. The cloned Vickrey society specifies a
specific architecture of a society (a cloned society) that interacts with a specific type of global MDP (a Market MDP).
C.1. Proofs
Proposition 5.1. Assume at each state s the local auction allocates Xi(b) = 1 if i wins and Xi(b) = 0 if i loses. Then all
primitives ωi bidding their optimal societal Q-values Q∗Ω(s, ω
i) collectively induce an optimal global policy.
Proof. For state s, the index of the primitive with the highest bid is equal to the primitive with the highest optimal societal
Q-value for that state. That is, arg maxi b
i
t = arg maxiQ
∗
Ω(st, ω
i
t). Thus, selecting the highest-bidding primitive to win by
definition follows the optimal policy for the Market MDP.
Theorem 5.2 If the valuations vis for each state s are the optimal societal Q-values Q∗Ω(s, ωi), then the society’s optimal
global policy coincides with the primitives’ unique dominant strategy equilibrium under the Vickrey mechanism.
Proof. By defining the valuation of each primitive ωi to be its optimal societal Q-value Q∗Ω(st, ω
i
t), the DSIC property of
the Vickrey auction guarantees the dominant strategy equilibrium is to bid exactly Q∗Ω(st, ω
i
t). The welfare-maximization
property of the Vickrey auction guarantees if all primitives played their dominant strategies, then the primitive with the
highest valuation wins, so specifying the valuations such that activating the primitive with the highest valuation at time t
follows the optimal global policy at that timestep.
Proposition 5.3. In a Market MDP, it is a Nash equilibrium for every primitive to bid Q∗Ω(s, ωi). Moreover, if the Market
MDP is finite horizon, then bidding Q∗Ω(s, ω
i) is the unique Nash equilibrium that survives iterated deletion of weakly
dominated strategies.
Proof. Consider time-step t. Assuming that every other primitive at every other time-step bids Q∗Ω, the best response under
the Vickrey mechanism for primitive ωi at timestep t would be to truthfully bid r(st, ωit) + γ ·maxk Q∗Ω(st+1, ωk), which
by definition of the Bellman optimality equations (Bellmann, 1957) is Q∗Ω(st, ω
i
t).
For the finite horizon case, we proceed by backwards induction.
Base Case: The last time-step T is a bandit problem where Q∗Ω(sT , ωiT ) = r(sT , ωiT ), so by Theorem 5.2 bidding
Q∗Ω(st, ω
i
t) is the unique dominant strategy.
Inductive Hypothesis: In time-step t+ 1, the strategy which survives iterated deletion of dominated strategies is to bid the
optimal societal Q-value.
Inductive Step: By the Inductive Hypothesis, in time-step t+ 1, all primitives bid their optimal societal Q-values if they
use any strategy which survives iterated deletion of dominated strategies. This means that in time-step t, each primitive’s
valuation for winning is given exactly by their optimal societal Q-value: r(st, ωit) + γ ·maxk Q∗Ω(st+1, ωk). Therefore, it
is a dominant strategy to bid Q∗Ω, and all other bids are dominated (and therefore removed).
Lemma 5.4 For a cloned society, at the Nash equilibrium specified in Proposition 5.3, what the winning primitive ωˆi at
time t receives from the winning primitive ωˆk at t+ 1 is exactly what ωˆk pays: bkst+1 .
Proof. If two primitives have the same φ, then their societal Q-values are identical, so their optimal strategies ψ are identical.
Then at the Nash equilibrium specified in Proposition 5.3, their bids are also identical.
Theorem 5.5. Define a cloned Vickrey society as a cloned society that solves a Market MDP. Then it is a Nash equilibrium
for every primitive in the cloned Vickrey society to bid Q∗Ω(s, ω
i). In addition, the price that the winning primitive pays for
winning is equivalent to what it bid.
Proof. (1) is by Proposition 5.3 and (2) is by Lemma 5.4.
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D. Decentralized Reinforcement Learning Algorithms for the Cloned Vickrey Society
Section 5 presented the cloned Vickrey society as a concrete instantiation of the societal decision-making framework whose
optimal global policy emerges as a Nash equilibrium of self-interested primitives engaging in local economic transactions.
Section 6 removed the assumption that primitives know their valuations and presented decentralized RL algorithms for
learning these valuations through interaction.
In this paper, we specified the class of decentralized RL algorithms by the learning objective – the set of local auction
utilities at every state. We presented the algorithm pseudocode for an on-policy variant of such a decentralized RL algorithm,
but the learning objective is in principle agnostic to the RL algorithm use to train each primitive. However, simply specifying
only one variant within this class of algorithm in this paper leaves much to still be explored. Adapting methods developed in
the monolithic framework, including bandit algorithms, off-policy algorithms, and on-policy algorithms, for optimizing the
local auction utilities the would be an interesting direction for future work.
E. Implementations of an On-Policy Decentralized Reinforcement Learning Algorithm
Stochastic policy gradient In this paper, we considered optimizing the bidding policies with a stochastic policy gradient
algorithm, which means that the bidding policies parameterize a distribution of bids. The stochasticity of the bidding policy
means that there need not be an explicit exploration strategy such as -greedy, which simplifies the analysis in this paper. In
future work it would be interesting to explore deterministic bidding policies as well.
Bidding Policies We implement all bidding policies as neural networks that output the parameters of a Beta-distribution.
Because the Beta-distribution has support between 0 and 1, we normalized environment rewards so returns fit in this range.
In theory, the range of possible bids could be [0,∞) and need not be restricted to [0, 1]. The society decision-making
framework prescribes a different unique local auction, with different primitives, at each state s. However, because the
state space could be extremely large or even continuous, in practice we share the same set of primitives ω1:N across all
states, express their bidding policies as functions of the state, and rely on the function approximation capabilities of neural
networks to learn different state-conditioned bidding strategies.
Redundancy Implementing two clones of each primitive means that each clone should share the same transformation
φ: if φ were the literal action of go-left, then there would be two primitives that bid in the local auction to execute the
go-left action. We implemented redundant clones by sharing the weights of their bidding policies ψ. Therefore, cloned
primitives have identical bidding distributions, from which different bids are sampled. Alternatively, we also explored giving
clone primitives the same transformation φ but independently parameterized bidding policies ψ. While we did not find much
difference in global performance with independently parameterized bidding policies, such a scheme could be useful for
multi-task learning where the same transformation could have different optimal societal Q-values depending on the task.
Learning Objectives The utility of the cloned Vickrey society is the learning objective. We compared three possible
implementations of this learning objective: bucket-brigade (BB), Vickrey (V), and credit-conserving Vickrey (CCV) as
described in Section 7.1.2 and Figure 3. We also compared with a baseline that sets the learning objective to be the
environment reward. For all implementations and the baseline, the learning objective that a loser ω that the auction receives
is 0 because its allocation Xi(b) and payment P i(b) are both 0. Letting bˆst and b
′
st denote the highest and second highest
bid at time t respectively, the learning objective Uˆ ist(ω
1:N ) of the winner ωˆ for state st is given below.
Learning Objective
Bucket-Brigade Uˆ ist(ω
1:N ) =
[
r(st, ωˆt) + γ · bˆst+1
]
− bˆst
Vickrey Uˆ ist(ω
1:N ) =
[
r(st, ωˆt) + γ · bˆst+1
]
− b′st
Credit-Conserving Vickrey Uˆ ist(ω
1:N ) =
[
r(st, ωˆt) + γ · b′st+1
]
− b′st
Environment Reward Uˆ ist(ω
1:N ) = [r(st, ωˆt)]
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F. Experimental Details
We implemented our experiments using the PyTorch library (Paszke et al., 2019). For all experiments, for proximal policy
optimization we used a policy learning rate of 4 · 10−5, a value function learning rate of 5 · 10−3, a clipping ratio of 0.2, a
GAE (Schulman et al., 2015) smoothing parameter of 0.95, a discount factor of 0.99, and the Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014)
optimizer. Each bidding policy has its own replay buffer. Each bidding policy is updated every 4096 transitions with a
minibatch size of 256.
The plots for Market Bandit, Two Rooms, and Mental Rotation were averaged over 3 seeds and the other plots were averaged
over 5 seeds. The metric for the learning curves is the mean return over 4096 environment steps. The error bars represent the
10th, 50th, 90th quantile. All experiments were run on CPU, except for the TwoRooms environment, which was run on GPU.
F.1. Numerical Simulations
All transformations φ correspond to literal actions. The bidding policies ψ are implemented as linear neural networks with a
single hidden layer of 16 units that output the α and β parameters of the Beta distribution. There is no activation function
for the hidden layer. We used the softplus activation function to output α and β. The valuation functions for the bidding
policies are also implemented as linear neural networks with a single hidden layer of 16 units.
F.1.1. MARKET BANDIT
At every round, we stochastically drop out a subset of primitives. For cloned societies, one clone could be dropped out
while the other clone stays in the auction. The drop-out sampling procedure is as follows. Letting N be the number of
total primitives (which means there are N/2 unique primitives in cloned societies), we first sample a random integer m in
{2, 3, ..., N}. Then we sample a subset of m primitives from the N total primitives without replacement. For a given round,
only the primitives that participated in that round are updated.
F.1.2. DUALITY
Figure 10. The Duality environment.
As stated in Figure 3, without redundant primitives the solitary CCV implementation sacrifices Bellman optimality in
general. We now use the Duality environment as an example to illustrate such an instance where the dominant strategy of the
primitives does not coincide with the global optimal policy of the society, even if the primitives have full knowledge of their
own valuations. The DSIC property of the Vickrey auction makes it straightforward to analyze the dominant strategies of the
primitives, which the following paragraphs illustrate. Recall that based on the CCV learning objective, the valuation of the
winner ωˆ at time t is the immediate reward plus the discounted second-highest bid (not the highest bid) at the next time-step:
r(st, ωˆt) + γ · b′st+1 . Let r0 be equal to the environment reward r(s1, ω0), r1 be equal to the environment reward r(s1, ω1),
and r2 be equal to the environment reward r(s0, ω1), where in Figure 10 we see that r0 = 0.5, r1 = 0.3, and r2 = 0.5
At state s0, primitive ω0 will bid 0, the lowest possible bid, because the local auction at state s0 would lead to unbounded
negative reward at s−1. This means that the valuation that ω0 has for winning at state s1 is r0 + γ · 0 = r(s1, ω0), since 0
must be the second highest bid at state s0. Thus the dominant strategy for ω0 is to truthfully bid r0. At s1, primitive ω1
will bid some number c. Since activating ω1 is a self-loop, ω1 can sell s1 back to itself in the next time-step. Thus the
valuation that ω1 has for winning at state s1 is r1 + γ ·min(r0, c). Thus the dominant strategy for ω0 is to truthfully bid
c = r1 + γ ·min(r0, c).
In the undiscounted case, where γ = 1, if we solve for c, we have that if r1 > 0, then c = r1 + r0, which is greater than r0,
which is what ω0 would bid as its dominant strategy. Therefore, in the case that r1 > 0, ω1 will continue to sell s1 to itself.
As long as r1 < r0 + r2, the self-loop at s1 will be less optimal than cycling back and forth between s0 and s1.
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In the discounted case, where 0 < γ < 1 and we again assume that r1 > 0. Solving c again, we see that if in the case that
r0 < r
1
1−γ , then c = r
1 + γr0 and c > r0. In this case ω1 will bid higher than ω0 at state s1, creating a perpetual self-loop.
If instead r0 > r
1
1−γ , then c =
r1
1−γ and c < r
0. In this case ω0 will bid higher than ω1 at state s1, which is the optimal
global policy.
Therefore the Duality environment illustrates that without redundancy, for fortuitous settings of r0 and r1, the dominant
strategy equilibrium of the society may coincide with the optimal global policy, but if the for other choices of r0 and r1, the
dominant strategy equilibrium of the society may be globally suboptimal. Adding redundant primitives makes the auction
utilities consistent with the Bellman optimality equations and therefore does not suffer from such suboptimal equilibria.
F.2. Two Rooms
Figure 11. The Two Rooms environment.
The transformations φ0:2 are subpolicies pre-trained with PPO and have an action space equivalent to the action space of
the Minigrid environment. For these transformation subpolicies, the bidding policies, the value functions for the bidding
policies, the non-hierarchical monolithic baseline, and the hierarchical monolithic baseline, we adapted the convolutional
neural network architecture from https://github.com/lcswillems/rl-starter-files.
φ0 is initialized randomly in the room on the left and is pre-trained to take the done action once it opens the red door and
enters the room on the right, upon which it receives a terminal reward. φ1 is initialized randomly in the room on the right
and is pre-trained to take the done action upon reaching the green square, upon which it receives a terminal reward. φ2 is
initialized randomly in the room on the right and is pre-trained to take the done action upon reaching the blue square, upon
which it receives a terminal reward.
In the pre-training task, the society receives a terminal reward upon reaching the green square and no intermediate rewards.
In the transfer task, the society receives a terminal reward upon reaching the blue square and no intermediate rewards.
These subpolicies φ0:2 are frozen for these tasks. For all learners, we trained to convergence on the pre-training task, then
we initialized training for the transfer task from the best saved checkpoint on the pre-training task. The non-hierarchical
monolithic baseline could not solve the pre-training task so we did not consider it for the transfer task.
F.3. Mental Rotation
Figure 12. The Mental Rotation environment.
Environment Each 28× 28 image in the MNIST training set was first inset into a black background of 64× 64. Then
the image first rotated either clockwise or counterclockwise by 60 degrees, then translated left, up, down, right by 29% of
Decentralized Reinforcement Learning: Global Decision-Making via Local Economic Transactions
the image width, for a total of eight possible transformation combinations given these six affine transformations. These
transformation combinations were taken from Chang et al. (2018).
Primitives The transformations φ correspond to the same six affine transformations, summarized below: The primitive
φ0, φ0′ rotate-counterclockwise
φ1, φ1′ rotate-clockwise
φ2, φ2′ translate-up
φ3, φ3′ translate-down
φ4, φ4′ translate-left
φ5, φ5′ translate-right
ωi, and its bidding policy ψi, correspond to the transformation φi. The clones are indicate by i and i′.
Neural network architecture The pre-trained MNIST classifier, the bidding policies, and the value functions for the
bidding policies follow the same architecture as the convolutional neural network used in Chang et al. (2018), with different
output dimensions (10 as the output dimension of the MNIST classifier, 1 for the other networks). The PyTorch architecture
is given below:
network = nn.Sequential(
nn.Conv2d(1, 8, 4, 2, 1, bias=False),
nn.LeakyReLU(0.2, inplace=True),
nn.Conv2d(8, 8 * 2, 4, 2, 1, bias=False),
nn.BatchNorm2d(8 * 2),
nn.LeakyReLU(0.2, inplace=True),
nn.Conv2d(8 * 2, 8 * 4, 4, 2, 1, bias=False),
nn.BatchNorm2d(8 * 4),
nn.LeakyReLU(0.2, inplace=True),
nn.Conv2d(8 * 4, 8 * 8, 4, 2, 1, bias=False),
nn.BatchNorm2d(8 * 8),
nn.LeakyReLU(0.2, inplace=True),
nn.Conv2d(8 * 8, outdim, 4, 1, 0, bias=False))
